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GOVERNANCE IN IS OUTSOURCING 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper explores how and why contractual and relational governance evolve over time in 
information systems (IS) outsourcing projects. Governance is broken down into its foundation and 
action dimension resulting in four governance parameters: trust /norms and informal control 
representing relational governance; contract and formal control reflecting contractual governance. 
Drawing on the lenses of punctuated equilibrium and biological interaction, we examine both 
incremental and disruptive change along our four governance parameters. The findings from four 
longitudinal IS outsourcing projects suggest that incremental changes are driven by interactions 
between governance parameters. We found three basic patterns of interaction between governance 
parameters (mutualism, commensalism, competition) that explain incremental changes. In contrast, 
disruptive governance changes during revolutions are driven by stark contextual changes. However, 
interactions during equilibriums may lead to self-perpetuating dynamics that may detract governance 
from basic outsourcing objectives. Revolutions may break these self-perpetuating dynamics and 
redirect governance to basic objectives. 
 
Keywords: Contractual Governance, Relational Governance, IS Outsourcing, Dynamic Perspective, 
Punctuated Equilibrium, Governance Interaction, Biological Interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of contractual and relational governance for successful information systems (IS) 
outsourcing is now well recognized [1-4]. Typically they are used in combination in IS outsourcing 
projects in the form of a governance portfolio [c.f., 5, 6]. As an example, client and vendor 
contractually agree to follow formal processes (contractual governance) and additionally rely on trust-
based spontaneous cooperation (relational governance) [7]. The composition of this portfolio in a 
particular IS outsourcing arrangement was found to be contingent upon the particular context as 
reflected by the characteristics of the outsourced task or the involved stakeholders [6]. 
The outsourcing context, however, is often subject to change over time, requiring the portfolio of 
governance mechanisms to be adapted accordingly. For example, Kirsch [8] found the portfolio of 
control mechanisms used in outsourcing projects to change from one project phase to another. Similar 
findings emerged from other studies that have taken a dynamic perspective on IS outsourcing 
governance [e.g., 9, 10]. These studies share a common focus on critical events or encounters that 
represent rare and disruptive contextual changes that are followed by major governance changes [11]. 
The focus on such event driven disruptive governance change is in stark contrast to research that holds 
that change unfolds in an incremental and continuous way [11, 12]. Moreover, such incremental 
governance changes may unfold in a rather subtle way through the social process of service delivery 
itself rather than being established by an authority at a single point of time [13]. For example, if the 
development of a software application is outsourced to an external vendor, the software requirements 
are rarely fixed at the outset; instead, the requirements often emerge after the actual development 
process has started and it is likely that new software functionalities may be added during all phases of 
a project. To govern such a constantly moving target might necessitate changing governance 
mechanisms regularly. To see if this is true, this study examines two specific research questions: How 
do IS outsourcing governance mechanisms change over time both incrementally and disruptively? And 
what are the drivers for such incremental as opposed to disruptive changes? 
To establish a conceptual umbrella that captures both incremental and disruptive changes in IS 
outsourcing governance mechanisms, we draw on the punctuated equilibrium model [14] from 
evolutionary biology. This model explicitly distinguishes between long equilibrium phases of 
incremental changes characterized by competitive, evolutionary selection, and short and disruptive 
phases of revolutionary upheaval that are triggered by strong events. However, as the explanatory 
focus of punctuated equilibrium is mainly on the revolutionary phases, we complement the model with 
a second lens from evolutionary biology - that of biological interaction. This theory explicitly 
recognizes the fact that the evolution of one particular species may depend on the evolution of another 
species. More specifically, the theory postulates that incremental changes of species are the outcome 
of five different types of biological interaction- Mutual Beneficial; Commensalism; Antagonism; 
Competition and Amensalism [15, 16]. Using this notion, we argue that similar types of interactions 
may exist between different (species of) governance mechanisms and that these interactions drive 
incremental change. 
To examine such interactions in detail, we first combine existing governance dimensions into a 
coherent framework consisting of four governance parameters: trust/norms; informal control; contract; 
and formal control. Two of these parameters - trust/norms and informal control - reflect the species of 
relational governance. The other two - contract and formal control - make up the species of contractual 
governance. We argue that interactions both within and between the species of contractual and 
relational governance breed incremental changes of governance. Phases of evolutionary interaction 
between governance mechanisms may then be punctuated by disruptive phases. 
To uncover interaction patterns between governance mechanisms we analyzed four IS outsourcing 
projects of an international bank over approximately four years. For each of these projects we 
identified incremental governance changes along the four parameters of our framework and mapped 
them to the five types of biological interaction. For both phases of incremental and disruptive change 
we uncovered different drivers of change. 
By opening the black box of evolutionary changes in phases of relative contextual stability, and 
contrasting them with those of contextual upheaval, our study provides new insights into how and why 
IS outsourcing governance changes. In fact, as shown in our results, revolutionary change is triggered 
by dramatic contextual changes. In contrast, incremental change of governance mechanisms is driven 
by interactions between and within contractual and relational governance. We identified three 
interaction patterns driving incremental governance change that together result in self-perpetuating 
(co-) evolutionary dynamics with refinement and differentiation of governance mechanisms as a 
result. However our results also show that phases of incremental and radical change are closely inter-
twined. This inter-connectedness causes a significant challenge for managers. Change driven by self-
perpetuating dynamics may detract from the initial outsourcing objectives. Revolutions in contrast 
may not only lead to the need to adapt governance to the new situation, but also to reverse those 
governance actions and routines that emerged during the evolutionary phase. 
Our study contributes to research and practice in three major ways. First, we build a process theory of 
IS outsourcing governance, which we identified as a major gap in the IS outsourcing literature [17, 
18]. In doing so we provide for the first time a micro-view on the emergence, adaptation and exercise 
of IS outsourcing governance mechanisms. Second, we introduce and apply the new lens of biological 
interaction to explain incremental changes of IS outsourcing governance. We thereby contribute to 
both punctuated equilibrium and reference theories associated with governance (e.g. control theory). 
Third, we provide managers with meaningful guidance on how to deliberately take advantage of the 
benefits of self-perpetuating incremental change and context-driven revolutionary change. 
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the theoretical foundation of our study. 
Next, the research strategy and design are discussed. We then present our data analysis and findings. 
Lastly, we offer the implications of these findings for research and practice. 
 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Four-Parameter Framework of Governance Change 
Since our primary objective is to explain how and why IS outsourcing governance mechanisms change 
over time, we follow a process-theoretic approach [19]. The first important step in this endeavor is to 
clarify the unit of change [20]. In our study, the unit of change refers to the particular contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms used in IS outsourcing arrangements. Prior research has 
conceptualized both contractual and relational governance quite differently. 
Contractual governance has been defined in two major ways; first, as “the use of a formalized, legally-
binding agreement or a contract to govern the interfirm partnership” [21, p. 898]. This definition 
highlights the use or exercise of formal control as defined in a contract. Second, the focus was on the 
contract highlighting its key characteristics (e.g., different types of service level agreements, 
complexity, level of detail) [22-24]. 
In a similar vein, two different ways of conceptualizing relational governance can be found. The first 
definition focuses on “the role of mutual trust, commitment, and relational capital” [21, p. 898] in 
forming the relationship between client and vendor. This perspective advocates social components – 
especially trust and shared norms – as the way to shape economic exchanges [22, 25]. The second 
definition emphasizes social actions, such as “open communication, open sharing of information, (…) 
and cooperation” (Lacity et al. 2009, p. 137) as the building blocks of a relationship. Such actions are 
referred to as informal control [8]. 
It is interesting to note that in both contractual and relational governance, emphasis is either given to 
the actions taken to govern a relationship, i.e. the exercise of formal and informal control, or to the 
foundations of contractual and relational governance, i.e. trust / shared norms and contract. It is further 
important to recognize that the foundation and action dimension of contractual and relational 
governance are not independent of each other. In fact, in contractual governance, the exercise of 
formal control (action) is based on the contract (foundation), and in relational governance trust and 
social norms (foundations) it may be seen as the basis for informal control (action) [26] [7]. 
Since our object is to capture the changes in IS outsourcing governance as comprehensively as 
possible and to consider possible dependencies between its sub-dimensions, we propose a framework 
that divides contractual and relational governance along their action and foundation dimensions: 
Contract refers to the foundation of contractual governance, trust and relational norms refer to the 
foundation of relational governance, informal control refers to the action based on trust and shared 
norms, and formal control refers to the actions derived from the contract. The respective framework is 
illustrated in Figure 1 and the definitions of its parameters in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The four governance parameters provide a referent [27] that will guide our empirical observation of 
change in contractual and relational governance. Each parameter can be subject to change through 
particular events [28]. For example, a contract may be renegotiated and hence be changed. This 
change may then be followed by new formal control being exercised based on the changed 
contract. This then results in sequences of events and associated changes in our governance 
parameters. We contend, that following these changes over time will likely result in dynamic 
paths of interaction along the parameters of the framework.  
Having now discussed what changes (i.e. unit of change) we turn our attention to how this change 
occurs. These patterns are informed by two theories from evolutionary biology: Punctuated 
Equilibrium Model and the Theory of Biological Interaction. 
 
2.2 Describing Change: The Punctuated Equilibrium Model 
The punctuated equilibrium model of change incorporates two types of change: In equilibrium periods 
change is incremental and continuous, while in revolutionary periods change is disruptive and 
discontinuous. Long and stable equilibrium phases are punctuated by brief revolutionary phases [14, 
29]. When several parameters of the proposed governance framework change dramatically within a 
short period of time, this would be a revolution. In contrast, when there are only small parameter 
changes over a long period of time this would be equilibrium. 
IS research has used Punctuated Equilibrium a number of times to study the dynamics of a wide range 
of phenomena [30] [31] [32] [33]. Research on change in governance and control mechanisms has also 
used models that “may be characterized as punctuated equilibrium” [30, p. 180]. The focus of 
punctuated equilibrium is on context-driven transitions between equilibrium periods, i.e. on 
revolutionary change. For example, Kirsch [8] investigated the change of control choices when a 
project switched from one phase to another and found that contextual changes trigger changes in 
control. These findings are supported by Choudhury and Sabherwal [9] who found “critical events” to 
trigger switches from one control portfolio to another. In a similar vein, Heiskanen, Newman et al. 
[10] describe how governance portfolios oscillate between phases of either trust or control. 
This one-sided focus on revolutionary changes, stands in sharp contrast to an emerging incremental 
perspective which holds that continuous change is a critical success factor and that governance 
mechanisms should “be constantly in a state of being corrected” [12, 34] [11]. Although there has been 
some insightful research on the evolution of inter-organizational relationships [35, 36], to the best of 
our knowledge there has been virtually no research on continuous change of inter-organizational 
governance mechanisms. Furthermore, the rare work that studied incremental change of intra-
organizational governance [11, 12, 34] largely dismissed revolutionary change. 
To conclude, while prior research acknowledged the importance of both disruptive as well as 
incremental change, its focus was on either the one or the other. Moreover, the fact that research 
inspired by the punctuated equilibrium model was mainly interested in revolutionary change [11] may 
be due to the fact that it provides a straight-forward explanatory model for these phases (revolutionary 
change is the outcome of large-scale contextual change and purposive organizational reaction), while 
an equivalent explanatory model for incremental change seems to be missing. We therefore 
 
2.3 The Theory of Biological Interaction 
Given its roots in evolutionary biology, the punctuated equilibrium model adopts competitive selection 
to drive change in equilibrium periods [20]. However, a major finding from evolutionary biology on 
incremental change is not incorporated in the model: While large-scale, revolutionary changes are 
driven by (large-scale) contextual changes (e.g. changes in earth’s climate, etc.), incremental changes 
are not exclusively driven by small scale contextual changes. Instead biological interactions are also a 
major driver of incremental change [37]. 
According to the Theory of Biological Interaction, incremental change [37] of species is driven by 
biological interactions of organisms between and within species [38]. Accordingly, we suggest that 
incremental change of contractual and relational governance (contract, formal control, trust, informal 
control) is driven by interactions between and within contractual and relational governance. More 
specifically, each parameter of our framework takes the role of an organism. Contractual and relational 
governance take the role of species, the parameters that make up contractual governance (contract, 
formal control) and relational governance respectively (trust / norms, informal control) take the role of 
members of the respective species. Thus, an interaction between trust and formal control corresponds 
to an interaction between different species, while an interaction between trust and informal control 
corresponds to an interaction within a species. We distinguish five types of biological interaction by 
their effect on change [15, 16]1: 
(1) Mutual Beneficial: In mutual beneficial relationships between two organisms both organisms 
benefit from the relationship. For example leaf-cutting ants provide cut-leaves for a fungus. These cut 
leaves serve as a fertile soil for the fungus. In turn, the ants feed from the fungus. The consequence of 
mutual beneficial interactions between organisms is that they mutually shape their evolution, i.e. they 
co-evolve. When organisms of the same species (e.g. humans) interact for their mutual benefit we 
speak of cooperation, while interactions between organisms of different species (e.g. ants and fungi) 
are called mutualism. Applied to the governance context interactions within contractual or relational 
governance could be described as cooperation. As an example, trust might facilitate informal control 
[39], whileinformal control in turn might foster trust [40]. Thus, over time trust and control might co-
evolve. 
                                              
1 There is actually a sixth “interaction” - neutralism - which describes the case where the participants of the 
interactions have no effect on each other. As a consequence there is also no change deriving from that 
interaction. It is therefore not adopted in this study.   
(2) Commensalism: In a commensalistic relationship, one organism benefits, while the other is neutral. 
As a consequence the evolution of the benefitting organism is shaped by the evolution of the neutral 
organism (but not the other way around). As an example scavengers like golden jackals follow tigers 
to feed on the leftover of their kills. In this case the jackal benefits while the tiger is unaffected. 
Consequently, a growth in the tiger population will be followed by a growth in the jackal population 
but not the other way around. Applied to the governance context: The exercise of formal control 
(contractual governance) might confirm expectations and thus foster trust [41] while a change in trust 
might cause no change in formal control. Thus, over time the evolution of trust might depend on the 
exercise of control but not the other way around. 
(3) Antagonism: An antagonistic relationship is detrimental for one or both of the organisms involved. 
In such antagonistic relationships the organisms mutually shape their evolution and therefore co-
evolve (typically in an evolutionary “arms race”). As an example in predator-prey relationships - such 
as between lion and antelope - the predator feeds on the prey. Obviously, the relationship is beneficial 
for the lion, but detrimental for the antelope. When faster lions occur, this will place a selection 
pressure on slow antelopes and conversely antelopes will grow faster over time which in turn puts a 
selection pressure on slow tigers, etc. Applied to the governance context, over time ever more 
sophisticated informal routines might evolve and replace some less-suited formal procedures. The 
“surviving” formal procedures might then be refined and again replace some informal routines. Thus, 
over time formal and informal control might co-evolve. 
(4) Competition: In a competitive relationship neither of the two organisms benefits from the 
relationship but both use the same resources; thus the relationship is mutually detrimental. If there are 
not sufficient resources for all organisms, then the growth of one organism goes along with a decline 
of the other organism as there are fewer resources left for the other. For example, chickadees and 
sparrows compete for tree holes (for nesting) - thus when one finds a scarce tree hole to breed and 
reproduce, another may miss out and in turn this bird cannot breed and reproduce. In the context of 
governance, such a competitive relationship is inherent to economic approaches on control. These 
approaches assume that the exercise and design of controls consumes resources and therefore is costly. 
Thus, controllers should seek to choose the least expensive control alternative [42] at the expense of 
some other alternatives, e.g. informal as opposed to formal control. 
(5) Amensalism: In an amensalistic relationship one organism is harmed, while the other is unaffected. 
As a consequence of this interaction the population of the harmed species declines, while the other 
remains unaffected. As an example, some bread molds produce penicillin as a bi-product which kills 
bacteria. Thus, the bacteria population is harmed, while the mold remains unaffected. Applied to 
governance, it has been argued that the exercise of formal outcome control destroys trusted 
relationships [40, 43], while the exercise of formal control does not require trust [44]. Thus, trust may 
decline while formal control is unaffected.  
 
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Method 
To answer our research questions on how and why IS outsourcing governance mechanisms change 
over time, we chose an exploratory case study approach[45]. Case studies are particularly suited to 
investigate how and why research questions [46, 47] as raised in this paper. As suggested by 
Eisenhardt [48], we entered the exploratory research field with pre-specified constructs: i.e. our 
framework represented by the four governance parameters; our distinction between incremental and 
disruptive changes (punctuated equilibrium); and the adoption of biological interactions to structure 
our findings. In concert with a process theoretic research approach, we “combine historical data 
collected through the analysis of documents and retrospective interviews with current data collected in 
real time” [28, p. 693]. 
3.2 Case Selection 
We chose a multiple case study design consisting of four IS outsourcing projects at a single site. The 
case site was selected because we already had positive experiences with BANK in terms of support 
regarding availability of interviewees and accessibility of documents. Moreover, we wanted to assure 
a comparable management style and background, and that the projects are similar in size (e.g., contract 
volume) and functions being outsourced. 
In 2009 BANK gave us the opportunity to choose four from about 90 outsourcing projects. The four 
cases were purposefully selected [47]. To increase the likelihood of pattern replication and variation 
[47] in terms of change within and between the four parameters of the framework, we needed to select 
cases with a minimum duration of several years. We also sought to hold those criteria constant that 
were not of direct theoretical interest (e.g. size and outsourced function). Based on these criteria we 
identified four projects which had already started, but which were still ongoing and expected to do so 
for the next few years. Table 2 gives an overview of the four selected cases. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
3.3 Data Gathering 
For data gathering we used multiple sources [47, 48], namely a combination of interviews and 
document screening (e.g., contracts, OLAs, SLAs, as well as project and audit documentation). The 
data collection took place in two phases. Phase one from September to October 2009; phase two from 
July 2011 to January 2012. 
Interviews: To avoid key informant bias [49] and receive different perceptions of the staff involved, 
we followed a multiple informants design involving managers and team members from client and 
vendor of each project[47, 50]. 
During the first phase of data collection 19 interviews were conducted, during the second phase 15 
interviews were done (see Table 3). In each phase, we conducted two interviews with relevant 
members of the centralized HR vendor management department, which gave valuable insights for all 
projects. These are listed in the column “cross-project”. 
Each interview was based on a semi-structured interview guideline and took about one hour although 
some were considerably longer. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. In addition, for 
each interview, short protocols containing impressions, highlights and additional interview subjects 
were created to prepare for subsequent interviews. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Documents: For triangulation purposes we supplemented interview data with a comprehensive 
document analysis [51]. Document analysis was focused on contracts. In line with Goo et al. [22] we 
understand “contract” in a broader sense, including related documents such as service level 
agreements (SLAs), operating level agreements (OLAs) and so on. Analyzing contracts and other 
project documentation in addition to interviews resulted in three benefits. First, we were able to 
confirm the dates when various changes occurred; second, to document the reasons and impacts of 
changes in behaviors and contracts; finally, to check, whether a reported behavior is formal, because it 
is listed in the contract. As an example, changes in histories of operating level agreements (OLA) were 
very helpful to track the exact dates, reasons and contents of changes. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
The aim of our data analysis was to uncover changes in the four governance parameters and to identify 
reasons for these changes. Similar to Sabherwal et al. [30] we followed a four-step data analysis 
process (within case analysis: steps 1-3, cross-case analysis: step 4). Each step was conducted 
independently by at least two researchers. 
Step1 - Order Data by Time For each case, the goal was to order data by time to reveal the 
chronological flow of events. For this purpose, a narrative strategy [28] was applied, to prepare a 
chronology of governance changes from the perspective of the individuals (based on interview 
transcripts). This data was triangulated with document changes. Subsequently, data was consolidated 
and visually mapped [28] to display temporal precedence, potential influences between events, and the 
passage of time. 
Step 2 - Coding of Documents and Transcripts Based on Framework Parameters. We used NVivo 9 to 
code documents and interview transcripts based on the four framework parameters (see examples in 
Table 4). In particular, text passages from interviews and documents that highlighted governance 
changes were mapped to the four parameters of our framework, whereas a parameter change could be 
both - a perceptual change (e.g. contract is perceived to be incomplete) and an actual change (e.g. 
contract was refined) [52]. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Step 3 - Identifying Source and Rate of Change To substantiate our supposition that incremental and 
disruptive changes are driven by different generative mechanisms [20] we scanned the data for two 
different sources of governance change, i.e. context and associated parameter changes. Thus, for each 
particular parameter change we analyzed whether this change was linked to changes in other 
parameters or the context. We will call chains of associated parameter changes interactions. For each 
governance change - be it driven by parameter or context changes - we then rated the magnitude of 
change. This allowed us to separate revolutions from equilibriums [28]: Phases showing a high rate of 
change (i.e., many and/or significant changes in a short period of time) represent revolutions, while 
phases showing a low rate of change (i.e. few and incremental changes in a long period of time) 
represent equilibrium phases. 
Step 4 - Comparison of governance changes. To discover similarities and differences between change 
in equilibrium phases and change in revolutions, we compared both phases with regard to the above 
mentioned generative mechanisms. Moreover, we matched each observed governance interaction to 
the five types of biological interaction. This step revealed similarities and differences between the 
large number of empirically observed interactions and thus to consolidate them to four archetypical 
governance interaction patterns[50]. 
 
4 RESULTS 
The following sections show the results of our study. First we describe each case separately, following 
roughly the chronological order of governance changes. These governance changes are characterized 
by changes in our four governance parameters that either represent interactions between particular 
parameters (incremental changes) or event-driven parameter changes (revolutions). Finally, a cross-
case analysis compares and summarizes the similarities and differences between the results. 
4.1 Case Description: PAYSLIP 
ALPHA is a company, headquartered in Illinois, US. They offer worldwide HR consulting services as 
well as HR Business Process Outsourcing. ALPHA was mandated by BANK to take over the 
PAYSLIP processing for their Indian branch from the former service provider. The former contract 
with the predecessor company for the payroll processing was canceled by BANK as there were several 
compliance issues. As shown Table 5 there were in total eight interactions in PAYSLIP, but no 
revolution. 
Interaction 1 During project setup around September 2008 ALPHA had to become familiar with the 
requirements of BANK, as BANK asked for “a proof of concept” before signing the actual contract. In 
the beginning, the client and vendor passed an informal process of exchanging knowledge through 
“many conference calls” (informal control) to create a shared understanding. This knowledge 
exchange extended ALPHA’s initial knowledge about BANK’s processes and demands, so finally 
“ALPHA composed a Note of Understanding (…) where they described their understanding, how the 
(…) payroll works”. Hence, the Note of Understanding - which was a predecessor of the legal contract 
(contract) - was created “based on the discussions”, as a member of BANK explained. 
Interaction 2 and 3 Later, the Note of Understanding shaped further collaboration. As a result, 
working groups were defined and conducted (formal control) which gathered the necessary 
information to agree on the first operating level agreement (OLA version 1.0) in April 2009 and the 
legal contract in May 2009. 
Interaction 4 May 2009 is also the month when the first payroll was carried out by ALPHA (Go Live). 
Since Go Live, both parties focused on building a good relationship. The relationship building took 
place during formal meetings. As an example, the OLA prescribes regular meetings (contract) which 
were conducted (formal control). A BANK manager talks about the meetings and their purpose: “our 
concentration (…) [was] on building the relationship with ALPHA (…). So we (…) [were] building the 
relationship with ALPHA. (…) ALPHA should work as an extension of our team”. This example shows 
that formal prescribed meetings also created an environment in which social interaction could take 
place. As a consequence trust developed (“[now] we have a good relationship with them”). 
Interaction 5 When the Go Live was over, both parties were glad to have shifted the project 
successfully into operational mode. This state was disturbed by the exercise of contractually agreed 
audit rights (formal control based on the audit rights anchored in the contract) which took place shortly 
after the Go Live. So far, both parties believed in the fulfillment of the policies, but the audit results 
portrayed a different picture. However, at this time, the relationship had reached such a mature trust 
level, that a senior manager from BANK described this time as: “Well, I think the relationship is going 
very very very well. (…) and there has been a time when (…) we had to close audit issues late in the 
night (…) I was able to speak to ALPHA (…) [and they] were able to turn around something for me”. 
Hence, although problems were identified in the exercise of formal control, they were resolved in a 
very informal way, based on trust. 
Interaction 6 Within the first version of the OLA (contract), BANK and ALPHA had agreed on a 
calibration phase to adjust negotiated service levels where necessary. A BANK manager notes: “then 
we had such a calibration phase for the service levels. Though, they were negotiated and then, within 
this calibration phase, it turns out, how feasible they are”. After this calibration phase (formal 
control), BANK and ALPHA refined the service levels and released a new version of the OLA 
(contract). 
Interaction 7 and 8 Moreover, during the last years, there are no indications of further governance 
adaptations. The payroll processing was slightly adapted several times, as in the Indian payroll 
processing yearly adjustments in taxes are common. These yearly adjustments as well as other new 
requirements were handled based on the Change Request process as described in the OLA. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
4.2 Case Description: HIGHPOT 
BETA, a company headquartered in California, US, offers a best-of-breed SaaS-solution for skill 
development and performance evaluation processes via a web based solution. In the first quarter of 
2009, BANK subscribed to this service to support its employee development and performance 
assessment processes. Initially, BANK and BETA planned and contracted a global rollout to be 
finished in the second half of 2010 - however at that time the project was still a small pilot for only 
600 employees (instead of the expected 40,000 plus). This delay was due to the fact that the parties 
underestimated the effort needed to parameterize the BETA software to meet BANK’s needs. 
As shown in Table 6 we examined one revolution in 2011 and a long period of incremental changes 
beginning in 2009 and ending with the revolution. In this period we observed seven interactions 
leading to incremental change in contractual and relational governance. 
Interaction 1 In February 2009 the parties negotiated a contract (contract) including a so called 
“governance model” being very specific on formal control issues. Though not specified in detail, this 
governance model included rules to conduct “configuration sessions”, a “weekly operational meeting”, 
a “monthly governance forum”, and a biannual “executive steering committee”. For example within a 
configuration session (formal control) BANK formulated the idiosyncratic requirement that the 
documentation of employees performance review should - in addition to the standard functionality - 
also offer a “superior’s view” that documents confidential information about how superiors judge a 
given employee. Then software engineers from both BETA and BANK elicited what exactly had to be 
done to meet this requirement and documented it in a “configuration workbook” which was “signed 
off” and became an addendum to the contract (contract). These additional requirements were 
subsequently used to assess BETA’s performance (formal control). 
Interaction 3, 6 Conducting the rules as described in the governance model produced a trend towards a 
higher degree of contractual governance. For example, the contract stipulated that the governance 
model had to be tailored to the specifics of the project (contract). As a consequence, BANK and 
BETA employees met (formal control) to refine the governance model, e.g., by defining necessary 
meeting participants. The resulting governance model was then written into an updated and signed-off 
OLA (contract). A very similar interaction (6) was observed later, when the parties made adjustments 
to the same contractual clause to develop a new rule on multi language capability of the software. 
Interaction 4 The just described trend towards a higher degree of contractual governance (following 
and refining the governance model) was supported by relational governance. As an example, at the 
end of 2009, BANK requested that BETA’s datacenter should meet “minimum safety requirements”. 
At this time BANK and BETA had established a trusted relationship (trust / norms) and started to 
informally exchange knowledge via spontaneous phone calls (informal control) to figure out which 
measures BETA should adopt to improve data center security. This led to a list of very specific 
measures, such as the “installation of a camera to track each person entering and leaving the 
datacenter”. This list of measures was furthermore equipped with milestones and became 
subsequently an update to the OLA and thus an addendum to the contract (contract) and later served as 
a basis for performance evaluation (formal control). 
Interaction 5 The next interaction shows how contractual and relational governance mutually shape 
each other: BETA was obliged by the contract to “conduct… [an] analysis” whether or not “BETA 
practices deviate from BANK policies” and if yes “to comply with it” (contract). In October 2010 the 
analysis was conducted (formal control) and revealed a number of compliance issues. However, the 
business model of a SaaS vendor rests on a limited degree of customization to realize economies of 
scale and therefore individual policy changes compromise its business model. Consequently, BETA 
sought a compromise and in doing so the parties relied on their trusted relationship (trust / norms) and 
started informally to mutually adjust (informal control): in spontaneous “phone calls” and “e-mails” 
the parties examined which policies BETA could tolerate and BANK could dispense without getting 
into trouble with their legal department. At the end of this informal adjustment process the parties 
agreed upon a new norm (trust / norms) and documented it in a “change control order”, i.e. it became 
an addendum to the contract and subsequently served as a new basis to control BETA’s policy 
compliance. 
Interaction 7 In October 2010, BANK’s internal audit routinely examined the relationship between 
BETA and BANK. The contract stipulated BETA to “cooperate with [BANK’s] internal audit” 
(contract) and when the audit was carried out (formal control) a number of issues came up. One of 
these issues was that up to this time, BETA had refrained from monitoring contractually-defined KPIs. 
But after this issue was detected, BANK started to monitor (formal control) the contractually-
prescribed (contract) KPIs. 
BANK did not address the other detected audit issues. Instead, following the incremental governance 
adaptations described above the project faced serious tensions in 2011. First, the rollout of the BETA 
solution was associated with serious unscheduled downtimes (5 days in Dec, 2 days in Apr, 4 days in 
Aug). Second, BANK and BETA decided to further postpone global rollout of a distinct module to 
2012. In short, BETA did not fulfill its contractual obligations. However, BANK did not impose any 
penalties nor did they ‘tighten the screw’, instead they continued to pay for the initially contracted fee 
for managing 120,000 employees. 
Revolutionary Period This situation changed dramatically when in August 2011 BETA published a 
new release that overwrote a number of code-based BANK-specific customizations which turned out 
to be “a tremendous problem”. Most importantly, the above mentioned “superior’s view” was deleted 
and thus employee’s had “visibility to the [confidential and hidden] comments documenting the 
discussion about them in the HIGHPOT review meeting”. When BANK realized that thousands of 
employees were able to see the confidential comments of their superior’s about their performance, 
BETA had to shut down the solution immediately resulting in five weeks of unscheduled downtime. 
This led BANK to radically change governance in a very broad way that not only addressed the 
current problem but also problems of the equilibrium period. First, BANK introduced a new “Key 
Operating Procedure” (contract) that obliges BETA to follow a significantly more restrictive release 
process (formal behavior control) that forbids BETA to publish a new release without having tested it 
on a new BANK test platform and without approval of BANK employees (“4-eye-process to ensure 
100% correct deployment to production”). Secondly, BANK “leveraged [the] existing governance 
model by “giving more weight to meetings” (formal control). Third, BANK was upgraded to BETA’s 
“Critical Account Program” that incorporates a more strict “Quality Assurance Process” (formal 
behavior control), a “New Deployment Process” (formal behavior control) and more demanding 
Service Levels (formal outcome control). 
While these measures are directly linked to the resolution of the underlying problem, BANK 
additionally changed its governance in ways that were not directly linked to the actual release 
problem. As an example, BANK developed a scorecard to assess BETA’s performance in a number of 
outcome dimensions such as “open audit issues”, “policy compliance” and “time-to-market”. 
Moreover, although the “root cause” of the problem was clearly a technical problem (“code defect … 
introduced in the… release”), BANK and BETA decided to spend “higher governance attention” by 
staffing existing meetings with more people from senior management. 
After this revolution in November 2011 the measures taken proved effective (“it has improved”). In 
particular, the “meetings” with senior management and the strict “release process” were credited with 
this improvement. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
4.3 Case Description: CANDIDATE 
GAMMA was a talent management software provider founded in the UK, which was acquired by 
DELTA in 2008. Two years before this takeover, BANK started its partnership with GAMMA, when 
BANK decided to support its recruitment process with a standard software. To reach this goal BANK 
assessed the ASP solutions of GAMMA and DELTA. In the end BANK opted for GAMMA; “thank 
goodness” as one BANK team member noted. GAMMA offers a “recruiter workbench” that walks 
HR personnel through the application process, i.e. after having successfully passed several approval 
stages, the system invites applicants for interviews, schedules meetings, and finally sends out job 
offers or rejections. 
As shown in Table 6 we examined one revolution in October 2008. Before this revolution we observed 
four interactions within the equilibrium. 
Interaction 1 When the project started in 2006, GAMMA and BANK negotiated a contract that was 
very unspecific in terms of governance. Despite this shortcoming the contract supported relationship 
building at the beginning of the project. The contract obliged client and vendor personnel to meet in 
person in “configuration sessions” (contract). When these face-to-face meetings were carried out 
(formal control), they not only helped to set the software requirements straight, they also provided the 
foundation (trust / norms) for subsequent informal control: “coming out of that [the meetings]” 
BANK’s and GAMMA’s personnel started to informally adjust through the use of “telcos (…), email, 
[and] WebEx sessions where needed” (informal control). 
Interaction 2 Subsequently, client and vendor personnel mainly relied on informal adjustments not 
only to solve problems in daily business but also to agree on far-reaching changes in the outsourcing 
project. As an example, in summer 2006, BANK and GAMMA came to a decision that would have 
serious consequences later in the project. The decision has its roots in the contract, which was not very 
specific as to what degree GAMMA’s ASP solution should be customized (contract). On the one hand, 
GAMMA was obliged to “provide the web services in accordance with (…) any mutually agreed upon 
requirements”, on the other hand the parties calculated only a very low fee for customization. In line 
with that, KPIs and SLAs included in the contract were typical for highly standardized SaaS-
outsourcing focusing on response times and downtime. However, when BANK realized that 
GAMMA’s standard SaaS solution did not suit its specific requirements, the parties conducted a 
meeting to carry out the contractually prescribed mutual adjustment (formal control). Within this 
meeting the parties began to diverge from the original contract - interestingly not by changing the 
contract but by agreeing upon a new performance norm (trust / norms). This new norm was different 
from the original spirit of the contract in that it advocated a very high degree of customization in 
contrast to a standardized SaaS. “It was Software as a Service [in the contract] - there was no 
customization. It was a one- to- many source relationship with BANK and quickly after the contract 
was signed that changed because there was quite a lot of customization required from the BANK 
process (...). That was very BANK specific and very quickly the system became very BANK specific”. 
Clearly, this new “customization norm” made the KPIs and SLAs, as defined in the contract, ill-fitted 
to the new situation. Consequently, BANK started to assess GAMMA as if it would deliver a 
customized solution, i.e. based on the newly negotiated norm (informal control). Note however that 
the contract itself with its now ill-suited KPIs and SLAs was not changed - the parties simply did not 
exercise the associated formal control. 
Interaction 3 The character of the project had switched from standardized to customized without 
adapting the contract, thus the contract did not specify respective requirements and rules for 
implementing them (contract). Consequently, the parties had to rely on their “cooperative” relationship 
that was characterized by an “I help you out”-attitude (trust / norms). This in turn allowed the parties 
to go “straight to specific members of the development [and] configuration team” to agree on or 
implement distinct “configurations” (informal control). 
Interaction 4 While this departure from the original contract was perceived to be very positive in the 
beginning (“it was brilliant”), it also sowed the seed for a number of future problems. In November 
2007, when the solution went live in Germany, India, the US and the UK, BANK was contractually 
guaranteed to become part of the regular release cycle (contract). However, when the first update was 
due the parties realized that the high degree of customization inhibited regular updates to work 
properly. To overcome this problem, management of both parties met (formal control) to agree upon a 
new norm (trust / norms). Accordingly, GAMMA was exonerated from its obligation to make BANK 
part of the regular release cycle, instead they were obliged to implement 30 minor bug fixes or 
customizations. Subsequently, GAMMA’s performance when publishing releases was no longer 
assessed based on what still was defined in the contract, but based on this norm (informal control). 
However, this new rule had the unintended side-effect that the BANK-customization “moved farther 
and farther away from the standard” which made each update even more complicated. However, from 
a governance point of view BANK and GAMMA took no specific actions to address the root-cause of 
the problems and as a consequence the perception of the project changed and BANK became more and 
more dissatisfied with GAMMA: “as soon as we were just trying to run it and trying to fix issues on a 
day-to-day basis, that was when it got worse”. 
Revolutionary Period: Despite increasing dissatisfaction, governance was only adapted incrementally 
from December 2007 to September 2008. This situation changed dramatically when in October 2008 
GAMMA was taken over by DELTA - the company BANK specifically opted against in the vendor 
selection process. From a governance point of view, a direct consequence of the takeover was that 
knowledgeable and trusted GAMMA employees  were laid off which caused the relationship to go 
“down hill”. This had consequences for the exercise of formal and informal control. Before the 
takeover, GAMMA was been described as “accommodating” and willing to “spontaneously help” 
(informal control), but afterward they concentrated on simply fulfilling their contractual obligations. 
Another direct consequence of the takeover was that BANK decided to stop the global rollout of the 
GAMMA application, as the new owner DELTA planned to discontinue support in 2012. In addition 
to these direct consequences, BANK took measures that were not directly linked to the underlying 
problem but rather addressed problems that had “strained” “the relationship” even before the 
takeover. First, contractually defined formal controls were enforced more strictly (“tighten the 
thumbscrew”). For example, BANK started to insist that the problems with regular releases would be 
failures to fulfill contractual obligations and therefore reduced the payment to the vendor, i.e., apply 
contractual penalties (formal control). Second, the contract itself was subject to change in two major 
ways. First, GAMMA was obliged to adhere to a new “build process” that formalized the introduction 
of new releases (formal control) and replaced the former agreement which allowed BANK to select 30 
items from the total list of items (informal control). Second, BANK addressed the problem that the 
KPIs were still tailored to non-customized software and therefore BANK “reviewed them”, designed 
new ones, and made them an addendum to the contract. This became the basis for subsequent formal 
control. 
After these turbulent times the partnership slowly got back on track. This improvement was credited to 
the measures introduced during the revolution which prevented “issues to boil over” while at the same 
time assured that the project’s “priorities don’t change”. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
4.4 Case Description: GRADRECRUIT 
EPSILON is headquartered in London, UK, and started its cooperation with BANK in 2000. The 
relatively small start-up company EPSILON signed up BANK as one of its first large customers. In 
the beginning, EPSILON developed an IT solution to handle the global graduate recruiting process 
based on BANK’s specific needs. This solution has been enhanced by EPSILON and transferred to a 
new platform (PEPPER) to sell it as an ASP solution to other customers. In 2007, BANK switched to 
this new platform. 
As shown in Table 8 there were seven interactions in ALUMNI, but no revolution. 
Since contract sign-off, the first years of collaboration between EPSILON and BANK were 
characterized by an intense collaboration to gather the necessary requirements for the development of 
the new system. 
Interaction 1 In the beginning, BANK was not aware of the specific requirements and demands. 
Nevertheless, EPSILON was glad to have BANK as a huge customer and therefore strained to please. 
A project lead from BANK describes this time: “when we started working with EPSILON. They 
literally were building the system in a certain sense for us, so we were very lucky”. The information 
exchange about necessary and desired functionality took place in a very informal way (“they were 
really flexible because we were a new client”). EPSILON was interested in learning from BANK, to 
build a tool which could be sold later to other customers as well, while BANK was happy to “drive 
some of the functionality”. The project lead added that “it was very very beneficial”. Hence, during the 
informal requirement gathering (informal control) EPSILON made sizeable concessions and promises 
which in turn improved trust (trust / norms). Based on an increased level of trust, BANK and 
EPSILON also increased the level of informal information exchange (informal control) about 
requirement issues and development tasks. 
Interaction 2 The number of issues and tasks grew constantly during the project and so did the level of 
informal control. After a while, the need for structure was perceived necessary as “EPSILON really 
could not grapple with the large number of inquiries and issues” anymore. The frequent informal 
information exchange took place on different levels; for instance, BANK directly called EPSILON’s 
developers to talk about additional requirements or issues. This informal information exchange on 
different organization levels had reached an extent where it was perceived as no longer acceptable. For 
this reason EPSILON complained about missing processes and roles and as a consequence BANK 
introduced a new manager into the project (contract) who collected the inquiries and issues and “then 
went to EPSILON, rather than many people going directly to EPSILON” (formal control). Hence, the 
frequent informal interaction was no longer perceived as adequate to manage the requirements 
gathering process. This increased the demand for more contractual governance which was established 
by bringing in a new role (single point of contact) which was subsequently used for approaching the 
vendor. 
Interaction 3 The switch to the new platform (PEPPER) increased the need for more contractual 
governance. A BANK manager describes this situation: “when we went to the PEPPER system (…) we 
would expect a whole business plan, communications plan and then detail all the testing session 
plugged in there (…) but they didn´t (…) we as a client (…) were going to manage this going 
forward”. She explained that BANK pushed the necessary procedures and structure into the project (as 
foundation for formal control). 
Interaction 4 Subsequently, the vendor followed the new procedures. A manager from EPSILON 
explained, “What usually happens - we have procedures that we go through” (exercise of formal 
control). These procedures are used to identify issues or requests for changes. When a necessary 
change comes up, EPSILON and BANK rely on their trusted relationship (trust / norms) and clarify 
the content and specification of the change request in an informal way (informal control). The 
following quote is an example of this: “often (…) [BANK comes up with] a query; they have 
something that needs to be fixed and (…) we have kind of an informal discussion about what we want. 
(…) after that (…) [I] write up a kind of informal specification putting everything together (…) and 
then we kind of send it back and forth”. Summing up, the formal procedures are followed (formal 
control) to identify necessary changes. Informal control mechanisms are used to gather additional 
information about what BANK really wants and what EPSILON is able to do. 
Interaction 5 BANK and EPSILON had agreed on penetration tests (i.e., simulating attacks) and 
disaster recovery tests. These tests were conducted (performed formal controls) and revealed several 
issues. The IT project manager from BANK explains (Interaction 5 and 6) that „these issues were 
resolved – and here it is important for me to emphasize – based on the good partnership, which means 
not based on any contractual agreements”. Hence, while the issues came up based on the exercise of 
formal control, the resulting issues were solved informally (informal control) based on the good 
relationship the parties had (trust / norms). 
Interaction 7 Later in the project, a new vendor management function within BANK triggered the 
need to create an OLA for the purpose of standardization across all projects. Again the trusted 
relationship between BANK and EPSILON was used to gather the relevant information for the 
required OLA document which subsequently was used in day-to-day interactions. A BANK manager 
describes that the OLA “defines the day-to-day business – the cooperation on this level. It is a 
guideline; this is what the OLA is for”. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
4.5 Cross-case Analysis 
Across our cases we found 26 interactions between governance parameters reflecting incremental 
changes and two revolutions reflecting disruptive changes. In this section, we begin with a mapping 
which overlays the interactions observed to the five types of biological interaction to uncover ideal-
type governance interaction patterns. This analysis step revealed three different types of 
commensalistic interactions, three different types of mutual beneficial interactions and one 
competitive relationship. Antagonism and Amensalism interactions were not found in our data. Table 
9 gives an overview of the interaction patterns observed in each case and references to the respective 
interactions. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
4.5.1 Mutually Beneficial Interactions: Between Governance Parameters 
We found both cooperation (within species) and mutalism (between species) in all four cases. 
Cooperation within the contractual governance dimension This pattern was found at HIGHPOT (I1, 
I3, I6, I7) and PAYSLIP (I2, I3, I6, I7, I8). In both cases the contract contains a clause (contract) that 
serves as a foundation for formal control. At HIGHPOT an audit review was prescribed, while at 
PAYSLIP the contract prescribed social interaction between client and vendor employees in several 
meetings. Within these meetings the parties started to socially interact and share knowledge. At 
HIGHPOT the exercise of the audit revealed vendor’s non compliance with BANK policies. 
Therefore, in both cases the exercise of control led to an increase in (control-based) knowledge [41]. 
Cooperation within the relational governance dimension This pattern is exemplified by ALUMNI 
(I1). Initially, a trusted relationship (trust / norms) facilitates the exercise of informal control (informal 
control) which in turn fosters the development of shared norms and trust (trust / norms). Hence, 
informal control benefits from a trusted relationship, while trust benefits from informal control and 
therefore the described interaction can be considered as cooperation. Thus, trust and informal control 
mutually shape their evolution. This interaction replicates former findings from general management 
[39, 41]. Additionally, the participants used this knowledge to either add clauses, i.e. to extend the 
contract, or to refine clauses. Hence, both action (formal control) and foundation (contract) of 
contractual governance benefit from the relationship with the respective other. Consequently, they 
mutually shape each other and therefore co-evolve. 
Mutualism between the contractual governance and the relational governance dimension Here 
(HIGHPOT, I5) the exercise of contractually-prescribed formal control revealed deficiencies in the 
fulfillment of contractual obligations. The detection of these deficiencies prompted the parties to 
informally negotiate (informal control) a new norm (trust / norms). The newly negotiated norm (trust / 
norms) was then being formalized and became a refinement of the contract that subsequently served as 
a foundation for formal control. Hence, contractual governance allowed the detection of deficiencies 
in the fulfillment of contractual obligations which enabled the parties to formulate the need to change 
governance. To derive this change the parties build on relational governance, i.e. they mutually and 
informally adjust (informal control) to derive a new norm (trust / norms). This norm gets formalized 
and therefore handed over in turn to the contractual governance dimension. As both contractual and 
relational governance mutually benefit from this relationship, they mutually shape each other and 
therefore they co-evolve. 
 
4.5.2 Commensalistic Interaction Between Contractual and Relational Governance 
Interactions between contractual and relational governance where either the contractual or the 
relational governance dimension derived a benefit while the respective other dimension remained 
neutral (commensalism), manifested in all four case studies. Three variants of commensalist 
relationships can be distinguished. 
Relational governance compensates for deficiencies on the contractual governance dimension. This 
pattern was found at CANDIDATE. The starting points are deficiencies in the contract itself, i.e. the 
contract is either incomplete (I2, I3) or a contractual clause is inappropriate (I4) (contract). The 
detection of these deficiencies prompts the parties to informally negotiate (informal control) a new 
norm (trust / norms). The newly negotiated norm (trust / norms) serves as a foundation for subsequent 
informal control. This new relational norm can be either supplementary or contrary to contractual 
clauses. 
Hence, in this case the detection of deficiencies in the contract enables the parties to formulate the 
need to change governance. This change of governance takes place in the relational governance 
dimension. Initially, relational governance serves as a medium to negotiate a new norm and then this 
norm is subsequently used as a foundation for informal control. Therefore, relational governance is 
changed to compensate for the deficiencies in contractual governance - while the contractual 
parameters in contrast to mutual beneficial interactions remain untouched. Thus, the interaction 
between contractual (neutral species) and relational (benefitting species) governance expressed in this 
variant corresponds to commensalism and therefore contractual governance shapes incremental 
changes in relational governance. 
Contractual governance fosters the foundation of relational governance. This pattern has been 
observed at PAYSLIP (I4, I5), HIGHPOT (I2), CANDIDATE (I1, I4) and ALUMNI (I4, I5, and I6). 
Initially, the contract contains a clause that prescribes a meeting with physical co-presence. 
Frequently, the purpose of such a meeting was knowledge exchange between client and vendor 
employees or the resolution of issues. Next, meetings were carried out (formal control), where client 
and vendor employees started to socially interact and as a consequence trust and shared norms 
between the client and the vendor started to evolve (trust / norms). These subsequently allowed for 
more informal control. Hence, the relational dimension is shaped by the contractual dimension, while 
the contractual dimension remains unchanged. Thus, we can speak of commensalism where 
contractual governance shapes incremental changes in relational governance. 
Relational governance enables the refinement of the contract. At PAYSLIP (I1) and HIGHPOT (I4), a 
pattern was found where in the first stage, trust-based (trust / norms) informal interaction took place 
(informal control). Interestingly, in both cases this informal interaction gave access to sticky 
knowledge (complex software requirements) that would otherwise be hard to get. And this knowledge 
was subsequently used to refine the contract when the requirements became an addendum (contract) 
and thereafter served as a foundation for formal control. Hence, the contractual dimension is shaped 
by the relational dimension, while the relational dimension is not affected in turn. Thus, this situation 
corresponds to commensalism where relational governance shapes incremental changes in contractual 
governance. 
 
4.5.3 Competitive Interaction Between Contractual and Relational Governance 
A third kind of interaction between contractual and relational governance has been found and can be 
described as competition - the situation where two organisms compete for the same limited resources 
and as a result the growth of one organism coincides with a decline of the other organism. 
Competition between contractual and relational governance compensates for deficiencies resulting 
from an overemphasis of relational governance. At ALUMNI (I2, I3) client and vendor employees 
relied so heavily on trust-based (trust / norms) informal control that the parties desired more 
contractual governance. They therefore started to formalize their interaction by contractually 
stipulating a communication and reporting structure. As a result, informal interaction (informal 
control) significantly declined, while client and vendor started to follow the new contractual clause 
(formal control). The reason that triggered the desire to move away from relational governance was 
that it was perceived to be too costly and time-consuming (“we could not grapple with it”) compared 
to contractual governance. The argument that relational governance mechanisms tend to be more 
costly than contractual mechanisms is in line with Thompson’s administrative theory [53] and 
provides insight into the nature of their interaction: Both contractual and relational governance seem to 
utilize the same limited resources (time, money, etc.). As relational governance was perceived to be 
too resource-consuming, the parties started to rely on contractual governance and in turn reduced 
relational governance. Thus, the decline of relational governance is accompanied by an increase of 
contractual governance to circumvent resource consumption. 
Our results show that governance changes even in phases where the context is relatively stable. Thus, 
contrary to prior literature [4, 5] changes in the context are not the exclusive driver of incremental 
governance change. Instead, as shown in our results four different patterns of governance interaction 
drive this incremental change. 
 
4.5.4 Revolutionary Changes as a Reaction on Cumulated Context Changes 
Two cases (CANDIDATE, HIGHPOT) suggest that phases of incremental change are punctuated by 
revolutionary changes: At both CANDIDATE and HIGHPOT we observed a large number of 
significant changes in a short period of time that affected all four governance parameters and 
consequently resulted in a high rate of change. Both revolutions observed were triggered by strong 
events - a vendor takeover at CANDIDATE and the introduction of a “buggy” release that overwrote 
all BANK-specific customizations and more importantly declassified confidential information at 
HIGHPOT. This need for strong events that trigger a revolution is in line with punctuated 
equilibrium’s inertia assumption [14]. However, the consequential changes were not all directed to 
absorb the influence of the trigger, i.e. to adapt to the new situation. Instead, the changes made were 
also retroactive adaptations to formerly non-addressed problems that took place in equilibrium periods 
but that seemed to be too weak to trigger a revolution. Moreover, at both CANDIDATE and 
HIGHPOT the parties resorted to the initial objectives of the contract by partially reversing those 
governance actions and routines that emerged during the evolutionary phase. 
 5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
As noted above, our results explain change in equilibrium periods as a result of internal dynamics 
between the four parameters of our framework and revolutionary change as being triggered by strong 
events. Our study offers a number of important theoretical and practical implications. 
 
5.1 Framework Enables a “Micro-View” on Governance Change 
We have proposed a framework to better understand change in contractual and relational governance. 
The framework divides contractual and relational governance into foundation and action. This 
framework conceptually contributes to research on contractual and relational governance in two 
respects. First, prior research has shown conceptual differences by either emphasizing the foundation 
of governance mechanisms (i.e., trust / norms, contract) [23] [21], or the derived actions (i.e., formal 
and informal control) [6, 54]. Our framework integrates these separate perspectives and offers new 
insights into the interactions between governance parameters. Second, while integrating these different 
perspectives the framework does not simply merge them, instead it acknowledges the conceptual 
distinctiveness of each parameter by keeping them separate. This contributes to more recent claims 
holding that trust and informal control, as well as contract and formal control should be kept separate 
[2, 40, 55]. 
Additionally, our conceptual framework serves first and foremost as a tool to describe governance 
change. The framework enables the reconstruction of interaction patterns of governance change that 
occur as paths along and across its dimensions. In doing so, we believe we were the first to empirically 
capture the complex interdependencies between all four parameters of contractual and relational 
governance as described in the literature [39-41]. Our empirical investigation does not analyze change 
from one high-level governance portfolio to another; rather it provides a micro-view on the 
emergence, adaptation and exercise of governance mechanisms. Our study provides the basis to “more 
closely examine the dynamics” of governance [56, p.72]. The significance of the dynamic interaction 
patterns is taken up in the next section. 
 
5.2 Theory Extension: Interaction Patterns between Governance Parameters 
The simultaneous analysis of small-scale, incremental change and large-scale disruptive change 
allowed us to trace back different rates of change to different drivers of change. We found that, just 
like biological interactions drive incremental biological evolution [37], so too do interactions between 
and within contractual and relational governance drive incremental change of governance. This means 
that incremental change of governance mechanisms cannot be exclusively explained with incremental 
context changes. We have identified three governance interaction patterns. Each of them has 
predictable consequences for incremental governance change: Mutual beneficial interactions breed co-
evolution, commensalism interaction leads to changes in the benefitting governance species, and 
competition to the decline of one governance species in favor of the other. Thus, these patterns are a 
first step to explaining incremental governance change that is independent from the context. While our 
results do not deny the importance of context changes, they add an additional driver explaining 
incremental governance change – internal dynamics between governance parameters. 
These results add to both the punctuated equilibrium model of change [57] as well as to control theory 
[44, 58]. Punctuated equilibrium figures “competitive selection” [20, p. 530] to drive incremental 
change. Notably, while we also have identified competition for resources as a driving force of 
governance change, other competitive interactions like antagonism and amensalism were not found in 
our data. Instead our results challenge the assumption that different types of governance mechanisms 
predominantly compete or even harm each other. On the contrary, we have found mutually beneficial 
(cooperation and mutualism) and commensalist interactions between governance parameters, i.e. we 
have found three patterns of interactions where at least one parameter benefits. Thus, they extend 
punctuated equilibrium with another three interaction types - besides competition - that explain 
change. First, mutual beneficial interactions illuminate the dependency of governance parameters, in 
that they mutually build on each other over time, striving for higher levels of maturity in a particular 
dimension (e.g. more complete contracts) and thereby even reinforcing this movement towards a 
higher level of maturity. Second, in a commensalistic interaction an unsatisfactory level of one 
dimension serves as a motivating force for enhancing another governance dimension and thereby 
again opens up the possibility to reach a higher degree of maturity. 
It is important to note that these patterns may either be actively sought by the stakeholders involved or 
emerge somewhat unconsciously (e.g. trust evolves as a consequence of informal meetings without the 
explicit intention to increase trust), i.e. they may be seen as active or passive incremental adaptations. 
This thought is expanded upon in implications for practice. 
 
5.3 Theory Extension: Hidden Inter-connectedness of Equilibrium and Revolution 
In two cases (CANDIDATE, HIGHPOT) long periods of evolutionary change were punctuated by 
short periods of revolutionary upheaval [14]. This finding is consistent with the basic punctuated 
equilibrium model and stresses the usefulness of punctuated equilibrium to describe human affairs 
[59]. Our results also demonstrate that revolutions are triggered by 
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strong events and as a consequence contractual and relational governance are significantly and 
purposefully changed. This is in line with control theory [44] and replicates former findings on 
disruptive change of governance mechanisms [8, 9]. 
In addition our results highlight the inter-connectedness of equilibriums and revolutions. While 
revolutions are triggered by events, the changes made are not exclusively directed to absorb the 
influence of the triggers, instead they are also retroactive adaptations to formerly non-addressed 
context changes and problems of the preceding equilibrium. Thus, context changes accumulate over 
time and thereby connect revolutions to equilibriums. Moreover, in revolutions the parties resort to the 
initial objectives of the contract by partially reversing those governance actions and routines that 
emerged during the evolutionary phase. These complex connections between evolutions and 
revolutions bear potential benefits and risks. On the one hand, change driven by dynamics between 
governance parameters breeds highly specific governance mechanisms that are able to resolve highly 
specific problems arising in the process of service delivery. On the other hand change driven by 
dynamic interactions may unfold a self-perpetuating character and thus detract from the initial 
outsourcing goals. 
The interactions between governance parameters produce stable, informal routines and even 
contractually institutionalized formal control. Thus deviations from original outsourcing goals may 
even be reinforced by self-perpetuating interactions. Thus, the “big picture” is neglected, in favor of 
specific problem solving. This became a problem at CANDIDATE when further customization needed 
to be limited and performance evaluation to be reconciled with the specific needs of a now non-
standardized software solution. It appeared that a revolutionary event was almost necessary to become 
aware of and get out of this deadlocked situation, i.e., to reduce the gap between initial outsourcing 
goals (standardized software solution) by partially reversing those governance actions and routines 
that had merged during equilibrium. 
The opposite is the case with revolutions. On the one hand, revolutionary changes restore co-
alignment with the context and the initial outsourcing objectives. Thus revolutionary change is 
directed towards superior goals. On the other hand, the highly-specific governance mechanisms that 
incrementally emerged as an outcome of governance interactions were partially reversed. This may be 
problematic as contractual and relational governance are important storages for organizational 
knowledge [60]. Thus, the solutions to specific problems are neglected, in favor of the “big picture”. 
At CANDIDATE, a strict build process was introduced as a reaction to the revolution. Before that, the 
parties used an informal routine that had slowly evolved over time and that allowed the parties to find 
feasible solutions for BANK’s idiosyncratic requirements. In contrast, the new rigid build process no 
longer allowed for idiosyncratic and informal adjustments. Instead, changes must be in line with the 
contractually agreed objectives. 
The previous discussion shows that it would be favorable to combine the benefits of both self-
perpetuating incremental change and goal-driven revolutionary change without suffering from 
associated risks. How this could be achieved is subject to the practical implications of this study. 
 
5.4 Implications for Practice 
Our study offers three important implications for practice. First, as interactions between and within 
contractual and relational governance breed highly specific governance mechanisms practitioners 
should deliberately make use of these interactions. They can do this by designing governance 
mechanisms that are tailored to stimulate these interactions. 
One option would be to actively foster social interaction between client and vendor employees as it is 
essential for many interaction patterns: Social interaction between client and vendor employees is 
critical to building trusted relationships, to agree on new norms, and to share complex or even sticky 
knowledge. Following on from this, trusted relationships are the foundation to exercise informal 
control, norms may be formalized and serve as a foundation for formal control, and the improved 
knowledge can be used to refine the contract. Thus, the deliberate advancement of social interactions 
might stimulate a number of beneficial interactions between governance parameters. A common way 
to foster social interaction is by prescribing meetings or regular conference calls. 
However, it is also important to avoid those self-perpetuating interactions that can guide the project 
away from its initial objective. Thus, the second implication urges senior management to carefully 
monitor the development of incremental governance adaptations to prevent a gap between the 
direction of incremental governance changes and initial project objectives. 
Finally, in case a revolution can not be prevented, senior mangers should be careful in taking far-
reaching measures which may contradict the advantages of problem- and situation-specific 
incremental governance adaptations which were purposefully implemented before. Hence, in case of a 
revolution, we urge managers to explicitly address the trigger of the revolution, but not to overreact 
and reverse numerous meaningful incremental governance adaptations. 
 
5.5 Limitations and Future Research 
We recognize that this study has a number of limitations, which should be addressed by future 
research. First, we used data from one client company only. Although using multiple projects allows 
for some degree of generalization, we recognize the need for replication studies in other companies to 
either discover additional patterns of interaction or to confirm the findings of this study. This study is 
based on two rounds of interviews as well as a large amount of documents. Nevertheless, we were not 
able to retrace the complete timeline of these projects without gaps. Future studies may rely on even 
more fine-grained data and trace all governance changes over time, e.g., by making use of 
participative research approaches where the researcher accompanies a project from start to finish [e.g., 
61, 62]. We identified different patterns of interaction between and within contractual and relational 
governance. These patterns might help to clarify the recent debate on complementarity and 
substitution of governance mechanisms [7, 22, 23]. While mutualism might be an indicator of a 
complementary relationship, competition might indicate a substitutional relationship. As these 
interaction patterns have been spread over time in our cases, the relationship between contractual and 
relational governance may also be subject to change over time. There is a need for future research to 
empirically substantiate this supposition. These studies should also pay special attention to a 
methodological problem that biologist frequently face when analyzing commensalistic interactions: 
These relationships might also be mutualistic in ways that have not yet been detected, e.g. because the 
feedback interaction has not yet occurred, it is too subtle to observe or it cannot be clearly mapped to a 
triggering interaction. 
Although we recognize our research has a number of limitations, we nevertheless feel that a significant 
contribution to outsourcing governance has been offered. We trust that other researchers will continue 
building upon the knowledge gained from our research. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Parameter  Definition Based on 
Trust/Norms Trust refers to the positive expectations about another party’s 
intention or behaviors. 
Relational norms refer to expected behaviors that are partially 
shared by a group and directed toward collective group goals. 
[22, 26] 
Informal Control Informal control refers to control that is unwritten and typically 
“worker-initiated”.  
[55, 63] 
Contract A contract is a written document, accepted as binding by 
controlees, and capable of deriving control actions. 
[22] 
Formal Control Formal control covers formally documented and management 
initiated mechanisms. 
[9, 44, 55, 
63]  
Table 1: Definitions of Governance Parameters 
  
 
Figure 1: Four-parameter Framework of Governance Change 
  
 ALUMNI CANDIDATE HIGHPOT PAYSLIP 
Client “BANK”: Big globally acting German bank. All projects stem from the human 
resource (HR) department. Project management is decentralized, supported by a 
central vendor management. 
Project size All projects cost about 0.5 to 1.5 million US dollar per year. 
Vendor Vendor located in 
the UK. 
The initial vendor 
(UK) was taken 
over by its 
competitor (USA) 
during the project. 
Vendor located in 
the USA. 
Vendor located in 
the USA with a 
material branch in 
India.  
Place of 
delivery and 
management 
Project carried out 
by people in the 
US, UK and 
Germany. Solution 
rolled out 
worldwide. 
Project carried out 
by people in the 
US, UK, India and 
Germany. Solution 
was planned to be 
rolled out 
Project carried out 
by people in the 
US, UK and 
Germany. Solution 
rolled out 
worldwide. 
Project carried out 
by people in 
Singapore and 
India. PAYSLIP 
processing only for 
the Indian branch 
worldwide. of BANK. 
Project 
duration 
The still ongoing 
project started in 
2001 and the 
former individual 
development 
project was 
switched to a 
standardized 
platform in 2007.  
The still ongoing 
project started in 
2006. 
The still ongoing 
project started in 
2009. 
The still ongoing 
project started in 
2008. 
Focus of 
investigation 
2006 – 2010 2006 – 2010 2009 – 2011 2008 – 2010 
Project focus 
during time of 
investigation 
Preparation to 
switch from 
individually 
developed 
software solutions 
to a standardized 
platform. 
Customization of a 
new tool to replace 
the ALUMNI.  
Customization of a 
new tool to support 
BANKs global 
skill development 
and performance 
assessment 
processes. 
Transfer from the 
previous payroll 
processing 
provider to 
HEWITT.  
Table 2: Case Description 
  
# Interviews 
(Total: 34) 
ALUMNI CANDIDATE HIGHPOT PAYSLIP Cross-
project 
2009 4 4 3 6 2 
2011/2012 3 2 5 3 2 
Total 7 6 8 9 4 
 
# Distinct 
Interviewees 
(Total: 28) 
ALUMNI CANDIDATE HIGHPOT PAYSLIP Cross-
project 
2009-2012 5 6 6 8 3 
Table 3: Number of Interviews and Distinct Interview Partners 
 
Framework 
Parameter 
(Construct) 
Exemplary Quote for Parameter Exemplary Quote for Change in Parameter 
Contract "The OLA was part of the contract." 
“here was a second agreement which 
was signed by another group within 
BANK which was then brought into 
our overall BANK contract.” 
"That section [of the OLA] needed to be 
completed. (…) I finally had a chance to look 
at it a few weeks ago. Now it is finished." 
„create an addendum to a contract” 
Formal 
Control  "We do have them [Service Levels] in place and we do have a system where 
we track them." 
“Our monthly governance calls” 
“I have [contractually prescribed] 
“Now we (…) just go through that process.” 
„[a meeting] turned out to be very helpful, 
this is why we now also have these weekly 
meetings with the VENDOR project 
manager“ 
weekly meetings with (…)” „as a result of the audit, our monthly 
governance calls (…) became more 
important” 
Trust / 
Norms “I would say that I trust them” 
“The relationship on trust (…) 
play[s] a very great role”  
“Generally we trust them“ 
“Certainly it [the relationship] went down 
hell“ 
“the releases impacted our ability to trust the 
system” 
 “[it] can´t be solved at this [weekly] level 
and then (…) it is sort of agreed at an 
executive level the solution that we gonna do 
there.” 
Informal 
Control "It is very important, that we talk even it might be just for a few 
minutes” 
“It is more of an informal thing” 
"No, I am not [involved in the day-to-day 
governance anymore]. Once the project went 
into the live-mode, they don´t come to me 
anymore." 
“if there are problems then we contact them 
directly. Now (…) we have permanently calls 
between NAME and us.” 
“if there are new reports to be implemented, 
then there are ad-hoc meetings in addition” 
Table 4: Coding of Constructs 
 
Case / 
Interac
tion 
Illustration Description 
T/N = trust and relational norms, C = contract, IC = 
informal control, FC = formal control 
Pattern 
PAYSL
IP 
Interacti
on 1 
 
 
 
 
IC: Informal knowledge exchange via spontaneous 
phone calls take place to specify requirements 
C: Note of Understanding is created, which is the basis 
for collaboration (as contract does not yet exist) 
Commens
alism 
 
PAYSL
IP 
Interacti
on 2 
 
C: Note of Understanding prescribes working groups 
FC: Within working groups necessary information is 
exchanged to create an OLA 
C: OLA version 1.0 is created in April 2009  
Cooperati
on 
PAYSL
IP 
Interacti
on 3 
 
C: Note of Understanding prescribes working groups 
FC: Within working groups necessary information is 
exchanged to create the contract 
C: Legal contract is created in May 2009 
Cooperati
on 
PAYSL
IP 
Interacti
on 4 
 
C: OLA prescribes regular meetings 
FC: When meetings take place social interaction is 
directed towards an improvement of the relationship 
T/N: Trust was build and manifests in a relationship 
perceived as being good  
Commens
alism  
PAYSL
IP 
Interacti
on 5 
 
C: Contract prescribes audit rights 
FC: Audit is conducted and reveals several compliance 
issues  
T: Trusted relationship is used 
IC: An urgent audit issues is resolved informally 
Commens
alism  
PAYSL
IP 
Interacti
on 6 
 
C: OLA 1.0 prescribes a calibration phase to evaluate 
service level adequacy 
FC: Necessary service level changes are assessed 
C: New OLA version (1.1) is released, containing 
refined service levels 
 
Cooperati
on 
PAYSL
IP 
Interacti
on 7 
 
C: OLA prescribes a process for change requests 
FC: Change request process is followed 
C: Contract is refined 
Cooperati
on 
PAYSL
IP 
Interacti
on 8 
 
C: OLA prescribes a process for change requests 
FC: Change request process is followed 
C: Contract is refined 
Cooperati
on 
Table 5: Case Results: PAYSLIP 
 
Case / 
Interacti
on 
Illustration Description 
T/N = trust and relational norms, C = contract, IC = 
informal control, FC = formal control 
Pattern 
HIGHPO
T  
Interactio
n 1 
 
 C: Contract prescribes configuration sessions 
 FC: When configuration sessions take place SF and 
BANK employees elicit and document requirements 
for superior’s view in configuration workbook  
 C: Configuration workbook becomes addendum to 
contract  
 FC: Additional requirements used subsequently to 
formally assess performance 
Cooperati
on 
HIGHPO
T  
Interactio
n 2 
 
 C: Contract prescribes configuration sessions 
 FC: When configuration sessions take place it turns 
out that SF solution does not meet BANK’s 
expectations 
 T/N: A new performance norm is agreed upon: 
Contrary to the contract SF will not be obliged to 
roll-out the solution globally in 2010  
 IC: New norm used to informally asses performance 
subsequently 
Commens
alism 
HIGHPO
T  
Interactio
n 3 
 
 C: Contract stipulates that additional rules have to be 
mutually agreed upon 
 FC: Parties meet and further specify existing rules 
 C: Rules with higher level of detail become an 
addendum to the contract (OLA) 
Cooperati
on 
HIGHPO
T  
Interactio
n 4 
 
 T/N: Client and vendor have an established trusted 
relationship  
 IC: Informal knowledge exchange to specify 
minimum safety standard for SF’s datacenter 
 C: Minimum safety standards become addendum to 
the contract (new OLA version) 
 FC: Performance evaluation subsequently based on 
minimum safety standards  
Commens
alism 
HIGHPO
T  
Interactio
n 5 
 
 C: Contract prescribes policy compliance analysis 
 FC: Policy compliance analysis is exercised and 
reveals non-compliance 
 IC: SF and BANK start to informally mutually 
adjust to overcome underlying conflict of interests 
 T/N: SF and BANK agree upon a new compromise 
norm 
 C: New norm gets formalized and becomes an 
addendum to the contract 
 FC: Performance evaluation subsequently based 
upon the addendum 
Mutualis
m 
HIGHPO
T  
Interactio
n 6 
 
 C: Contract stipulates that additional rules have to be 
mutually agreed upon 
 FC: Parties meet to find out how to best configure 
SF system for multiple languages 
 C: New rule on multiple-language configuration 
becomes an addendum to the contract 
 FC: New rule basis for subsequent behavior control 
Cooperati
on 
HIGHPO
T  
Interactio
n 7 
 
 C: Contract contains right for internal audit.  
 FC: Audit is performed and a number of issues is 
detected. One of these issues is that BANK refrains 
from exercising contractually stipulated KPI-
evaluation. 
 C, FC: As a result, contractually-stipulated KPIs are 
monitored subsequently. 
Cooperati
on 
HIGHPO
T  
Revolutio
n 
n/a  C: New KOP that obliges SF to follow totally 
redesigned and significantly more restrictive release 
process 
 C, FC: New, more strict quality assurance process is 
introduced and followed 
 C, FC: New deployment process is introduced and 
followed  
 C, FC: New, more demanding service levels are 
introduced and followed  
 FC: Existing meeting given more weight 
 C, FC: New scorecard is introduced and 
monitoredFC: Meeting staffed with senior 
management 
n/a 
Table 6: Case Results: HIGHPOT 
 
Case / 
Interacti
on 
Illus-tration Description 
T/N = trust and relational norms, C = contract, IC = 
informal control, FC = formal control 
Pattern 
CANDID
ATE  
Interac-
tion 1 
 
 
 C: Contract defines configuration sessions and on-
site workshops  
 FC: Workshops take place  
 T/N: Within workshops trust and shared norms 
formed  
 IC: Parties started to informally adjust in workshops 
and web-meetings 
Commens
alism 
CANDID
ATE  
Interac-
tion 2 
 
 C: Contract is unspecific concerning degree of 
customization and stipulates to mutually agree on 
that later on  
 FC: Vurv and BANK meet to agree on degree of 
standardization  
 T/N: Vurv and BANK agree on new performance 
norm that expresses both parties will to customize 
the software 
 IC: New performance norm serves as foundation for 
subsequent informal performance assessment, while 
(unspecific) contract remains untouched 
Commens
alism 
CANDID
ATE  
Interactio
n 3 
 
 C: Contract does not specify requirements and rules 
for implementing them  
 T/N: Parties rely on cooperative relationship  
 IC: Cooperative relationship allows parties to 
implement customization informally 
Commens
alism 
CANDID
ATE  
Interactio
n 4 
 
 C: Contract stipulates that BANK is part of regular 
release cycle  
 FC: Regular releases do not work properly. Vurv and 
BANK have formal meetings  
 T/N: BANK and Vurv agree upon new norm 
 IC: New norm used to informally asses performance 
subsequently  
Commens
alism 
CANDID
ATE  
Revolutio
n 
n/a  FC: Instead of informal problem solving sheer 
fulfillment of contractual obligations  
 C, FC: Contractually agreed global roll-out stopped  
 FC: Contractually defined formal controls handled 
more strict  
 C, FC: Introduction and exercise of new build 
process  
 C, FC: New KPIs as addendum to the contract and 
basis for subsequent formal control 
n/a 
Table 7: Case Results: CANDIDATE 
 
Case / 
Interacti
Illustration Description 
T/N = trust and relational norms, C = contract, IC = 
Pattern 
on informal control, FC = formal control 
ALUMNI 
Interactio
n 1 
 
 IC: Informal information exchange to gather 
necessary requirements for software development 
 T/N: Promises and concessions improved the level 
of trust 
 IC: Afterwards increased level of informal 
information exchange 
Cooperati
on 
ALUMNI 
Interactio
n 2 
 
 IC: Frequent informal information exchange, but 
vendor becomes unsatisfied with it 
 C: Management agrees on a new role to bundle 
inquiries 
 FC: Subsequently the information exchange is 
performed in a more formal way 
Competiti
on 
ALUMNI 
Interactio
n 3 
 
 IC: Established way to resolve issues informally is 
perceived as not sufficient to manage switch to new 
platform 
 C: BANK pushes structure into the project (e.g., 
communication and testing plan) 
 FC: Coordination to switch to the new platform was 
performed in a quite structured way 
Competiti
on 
ALUMNI 
Interactio
n 4 
 
 FC: Agreed on procedures are followed and used to 
identify issues or change requests 
 T/N: Based on the trusted relationship 
 IC: These issues and requests are resolved in an 
informal way 
Commens
alism 
ALUMNI 
Interactio
n 5 
 
 FC: Agreed on penetration tests were performed and 
revealed several issues 
 T/N: Based on the trusted relationship 
 IC: The issues are resolved in an informal way 
 
Commens
alism 
ALUMNI 
Interactio
n 6 
 
 FC: Agreed on disaster recovery tests were 
performed and revealed several issues 
 T/N: Based on the trusted relationship 
 IC: The issues are resolved in an informal way 
 
Commens
alism 
ALUMNI 
Interactio
n 7 
 
 IC: Requirements for the OLA are gathered 
informally 
 C: OLA is created 
 FC: The OLA is used to manage the day-to-day 
interaction 
Commens
alism 
Table 8: Case Results: ALUMNI 
 
Case / 
Archetype 
Mutual 
Beneficial: 
Mutualism 
Mutual 
Beneficial: 
Cooperation
Commensal
ism 
Competitio
n 
Amansalis
m 
Antagonism 
HIGHPOT 1 
(I5) 
4 
(I1, I3, I6, 
I7) 
2 
(I2, I4) 
0 0 0 
PAYSLIP 0 5 3 0 0 0 
(I2, I3, I6, 
I7, I8) 
(I1, I4, I5) 
CANDIDA
TE 
0 0 4 
(I1, I2, I3, 
I4) 
0 0 0 
ALUMNI 0 1 
(I1) 
4  
(I4, I5, I6, 
I7) 
2 
(I2, I3) 
0 0 
Table 9: Interaction Patterns per Case (Reference to Interaction Ix) 
 
